For the first time in nine months, the sound of artillery has fallen silent in Gaza. But the ceasefire that ended the bloodiest chapter of the Israel-Hamas war is not a peace. It is a pause built on the hope that an international stabilisation force can do what no ceasefire before it has managed: keep the peace long enough to let Gaza breathe.
Israel's conditional approval for foreign troops to enter the strip under a US-backed plan has sent tremors through the region. Palestinians in Gaza, exhausted by displacement and bombardment, are cautiously welcoming the move, not because they trust the force, but because they have no other choice. The question now is whether this force can do more than stabilise. Can it rebuild? Can it prevent the next war? And, most critically for South Asia, what does this mean for a region already grappling with its own fractures and proxy wars?
Why This Truce Could Unravel, or Finally Hold
This is not just another ceasefire in Gaza. It is the first time Israel has agreed to the deployment of foreign troops on its doorstep since the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, a move that was supposed to end the occupation but instead led to Hamas's rise. The stabilisation force, if it materialises, will operate under a US-backed framework that includes Arab states and European powers. But the devil is in the details, and those details are still being negotiated.
The force's mandate is unclear. Will it be tasked with disarming Hamas, as Israel demands? Or will it focus on humanitarian corridors and reconstruction, as the Palestinian Authority and Arab states prefer? The ambiguity is deliberate. Israel wants security guarantees; the international community wants to avoid another cycle of destruction. The result is a force that may satisfy no one, and that could collapse under the weight of its own contradictions.
For South Asia, the stakes are not abstract. The region's energy security, trade routes, and diplomatic alignments are all tethered to the stability of the Middle East. A prolonged crisis in Gaza could reignite proxy conflicts that spill into Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Sea. It could also disrupt the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which relies on Middle Eastern stability to keep its energy lifelines open. The real question for Islamabad is whether this force can prevent the next war, or whether it will merely delay it.
The Ceasefire's Fragile Foundation: A History of Broken Promises
Gaza has seen ceasefires before. In 2014, after 50 days of war, a fragile truce was brokered under Egyptian auspices. It lasted less than a year. In 2021, another ceasefire was declared after 11 days of fighting. It held for three months. The pattern is clear: ceasefires in Gaza are temporary, and their collapse is predictable. The question is whether this time will be different.
The current ceasefire is tied to a broader US-led initiative that includes Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. These countries have a vested interest in stabilising Gaza, not out of altruism, but because instability in Gaza spills into their own territories. Jordan, for example, has already taken in hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees during past conflicts. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 plan depends on regional stability to attract investment. Egypt, meanwhile, has spent years trying to broker a lasting solution, only to see each attempt collapse under the weight of Hamas-Israel tensions.
But history suggests that Arab states will struggle to deliver on their promises. In 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza, Arab states pledged billions in reconstruction aid. Most of that money never materialised. In 2018, during the Great March of Return protests, Arab states again pledged support. This time, the aid was slow to arrive and often mismanaged. The lesson is that Arab states are willing to talk about Gaza's future, but their commitment is limited by their own domestic priorities and the region's shifting alliances.
The stabilisation force, then, is not just a military deployment. It is a test of whether the international community can finally break the cycle of violence in Gaza, or whether it will repeat the mistakes of the past.
What Happened: Israel's Calculated Green Light
According to reporting by Al Jazeera, Israel's approval for an international stabilisation force to enter Gaza is a significant shift in its posture. For months, Israel has rejected the idea of foreign troops on its borders, arguing that only its own security forces can guarantee its safety. But the pressure to end the war, and the humanitarian catastrophe it has unleashed, has forced a rethink.
The force is expected to operate under a US-backed framework, with Arab states playing a key role. The exact composition of the force is still being negotiated, but reports suggest it could include troops from Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, alongside European and possibly Indian or Pakistani contingents. The inclusion of non-Arab states is notable. India, for example, has deep ties to Israel and has been a vocal supporter of its security concerns. Pakistan, meanwhile, has historically aligned with the Palestinian cause but has also engaged with Israel in backchannel diplomacy. The question is whether these countries can bridge the divide between Israeli security demands and Palestinian aspirations for statehood.
The force's deployment is contingent on a broader ceasefire agreement, which includes a phased Israeli withdrawal from parts of Gaza and the release of Palestinian prisoners. The details of the withdrawal are still being hammered out, but the timeline is tight. The Biden administration has made it clear that the stabilisation force must be in place within weeks, not months, to prevent a vacuum that Hamas or other armed groups could exploit.
For now, the displaced Palestinians in Gaza are watching from makeshift tents and overcrowded shelters. They are hopeful, but not optimistic. As one resident told Al Jazeera, "We have heard promises before. This time, we hope it is different."
Global and Regional Reactions: A Patchwork of Support and Skepticism
The international response to Israel's approval has been mixed. The United States has hailed the move as a "historic breakthrough," framing it as a step toward a lasting peace. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been the most vocal advocate, arguing that the stabilisation force is the only way to prevent another war. The European Union has echoed this sentiment, with High Representative Josep Borrell calling the plan "a necessary step toward de-escalation."
But not everyone is convinced. Russia and China have criticised the force as a tool of Western influence, arguing that it will do little to address the root causes of the conflict. Iran, meanwhile, has warned that any foreign presence in Gaza will be seen as an occupation. Hamas, which has not been directly consulted on the force's deployment, has remained silent, though its leaders have hinted that they will not accept any arrangement that does not include a clear path to Palestinian statehood.
In the Middle East, reactions are equally divided. Egypt, which has long played the role of mediator, has welcomed the plan but warned that it must be accompanied by a political process. Jordan's King Abdullah has gone further, calling for an international conference to address the broader Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia, which has been engaged in normalization talks with Israel, has struck a cautious tone, emphasising the need for a "comprehensive and just solution."
The most notable absence in the discussions is Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has positioned himself as a champion of the Palestinian cause, has been conspicuously quiet. Analysts suggest this is a tactical move, designed to avoid alienating either Israel or the Arab states that are key to the stabilisation force's success. But Turkey's silence also reflects the broader uncertainty about the force's mandate and its chances of success.
South Asia Impact: The Domino Effect on Trade, Security, and Diplomacy
The stabilisation force in Gaza is not just a Middle Eastern story. For South Asia, it is a geopolitical earthquake with aftershocks that could reshape trade routes, security alliances, and diplomatic alignments across the region.
For Pakistan, the implications are immediate. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) relies on stable energy supplies from the Middle East. A prolonged crisis in Gaza could disrupt these supplies, raising energy prices and stoking domestic unrest. Pakistan's military, which has long played a role in Middle Eastern conflicts as a mediator and peacekeeper, may find itself under pressure to contribute troops to the stabilisation force, a move that could strain its already tense relationship with India and complicate its balancing act between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
India, meanwhile, has a different set of concerns. New Delhi has deepened its ties with Israel in recent years, particularly in the areas of defence and technology. But India also has a significant Muslim population and a history of supporting the Palestinian cause. The stabilisation force could force India to walk a tightrope: supporting Israel's security concerns while avoiding alienating its own Muslim constituents or its Arab partners. The question is whether India can use its growing influence in the Middle East to push for a political solution, or whether it will be seen as complicit in an arrangement that does little to address Palestinian aspirations.
The broader regional dynamic is equally fraught. The stabilisation force could either reinforce the existing order, with the US and its allies taking the lead, -or it could become a flashpoint for renewed proxy wars. Saudi Arabia and Iran, already engaged in a cold war across the Middle East, could see Gaza as another battleground for influence. Pakistan, which has historically aligned with Saudi Arabia, may find itself pulled into this rivalry, particularly as Riyadh seeks to counter Iran's growing influence in the region.
The last time a similar dynamic played out in South Asia was during the 2019 Pulwama crisis, when tensions between India and Pakistan escalated after a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir. The crisis was ultimately defused through backchannel diplomacy, but it exposed the fragility of regional stability. A prolonged crisis in Gaza could have a similar effect, pulling South Asian states into a conflict that has little to do with their own interests, and even less to do with their ability to influence its outcome.
What Happens Next: The Force's Three Existential Tests
Analysts expect the stabilisation force to face three critical tests in the coming months. The first is its mandate. Will the force be tasked with disarming Hamas, as Israel wants? Or will it focus on humanitarian aid and reconstruction, as the Palestinian Authority and Arab states prefer? The answer will determine whether the force is seen as an occupying power or a neutral arbiter. The most likely outcome is a compromise: the force will have a limited mandate focused on stabilisation, with disarmament left to a future political process.
The second test is the force's composition. Reports suggest that Arab states will play a key role, but their involvement is not guaranteed. Egypt, for example, has already warned that it will not deploy troops without a clear political horizon. Jordan, meanwhile, has insisted that the force must be accompanied by a broader peace initiative. The inclusion of non-Arab states like India or Pakistan could help bridge the divide, but it could also deepen existing tensions. The most likely outcome is a force dominated by Arab states, with limited participation from outside powers.
The third test is time. The Biden administration has set a tight deadline for the force's deployment, but history suggests that such timelines are rarely met. The longer the delay, the greater the risk that spoilers, whether Hamas, Israeli settlers, or regional powers, will sabotage the process. Analysts expect the force to be in place within three to six months, but the window for success is narrow. If the force fails to stabilise Gaza within a year, the ceasefire could collapse, and the cycle of violence could begin again.
A key question is whether the stabilisation force can create the conditions for a political process. The Oslo Accords of 1993 were supposed to lead to a two-state solution, but they instead entrenched the occupation. The current framework does not include a clear political horizon. Without one, the stabilisation force risks becoming just another failed experiment in imposed peace.
Can Gaza's Truce Outlast the Force?
The stabilisation force is not a peacekeeping mission. It is a stopgap, designed to buy time for a political solution that has yet to materialise. The question is whether this time will be different. The answer depends on three factors: the force's mandate, its composition, and its timeline. If the force is seen as an occupying power, it will fail. If it is seen as a neutral arbiter, it may succeed. But even then, its success will depend on whether Israel and Hamas can agree on a political process, and whether the international community can deliver on its promises.
For the displaced Palestinians in Gaza, the stakes could not be higher. They have lived through nine months of war, displacement, and blockade. They have seen ceasefires come and go. They have heard promises broken. The stabilisation force offers a glimmer of hope, but it is a fragile one. The question is whether this hope can outlast the force, or whether it will be buried under the weight of history's failures.
The answer will shape not just Gaza's future, but the future of the Middle East, and South Asia. For the first time in decades, the region has a chance to break the cycle of violence. Whether it seizes that chance will depend on forces beyond its control.
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Key Takeaways
- Israel's approval for an international stabilisation force in Gaza is a tactical shift, not a strategic one. The force's success will hinge on a mandate that balances Israeli security demands with Palestinian aspirations, a balance that has eluded every previous attempt at peace.
- South Asia's energy security and trade routes are directly tied to Gaza's stability. A prolonged crisis could disrupt oil and gas supplies, raise energy prices, and force Pakistan and India to recalibrate their regional strategies, potentially pulling them into Middle Eastern proxy wars.
- The stabilisation force is a gamble that could either stabilise Gaza or deepen its fragmentation. Without a clear political horizon, the force risks becoming another failed experiment in imposed peace, one that could reignite violence and pull South Asia into a conflict it cannot control.
