The International Stabilization Force (ISF) is not just another peacekeeping mission. It is the thin end of a wedge that could redefine who polices Gaza, and, by extension, who polices the wider Levant. Israel's cabinet approval on Sunday to allow 200 troops from 'friendly countries' into Gaza under a US-brokered framework is less about humanitarian relief and more about locking in a new security architecture before the guns fall silent for good. The force will operate only in the 30 percent of Gaza that Israel no longer occupies, yet its presence will determine whether the strip's 2 million people ever regain the semblance of sovereignty. The decision lands the day before Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu flies to Washington, a trip that will either cement or fracture the last vestiges of US primacy in the region. For South Asia, the ripple effects are already visible: the same corridor that once funnelled militants and weapons from Afghanistan into Kashmir is now a potential transit route for foreign fighters returning from the Levant. The question is whether Islamabad and New Delhi can turn this moment into leverage, or whether they will be left watching from the sidelines as Washington redraws the map.
Why This Could Unravel the Middle East's Fragile Truce
This is not a peace deal. It is a power grab disguised as stabilisation. The ISF's mandate to operate only in areas outside Israeli control is a legal fig leaf that preserves Israel's 70 percent occupation of Gaza while outsourcing the dirty work of pacification to African and Arab troops. The force's composition, Uganda and Morocco, with more partners expected, mirrors the Trump administration's preference for 'friendly countries' over traditional Western allies, a shift that signals Washington's waning appetite for boots on the ground in the Middle East. Yet the gamble is perilous: if the ISF is seen as an Israeli proxy, it will radicalise the very factions it is meant to contain. The Palestinian Ministry of Health's toll, 1,200 killed and 3,888 wounded since the October ceasefire, shows that violence has not abated; it has merely been outsourced. The 'Board of Peace' proposed by the Trump plan is already a non-starter, with Western capitals refusing to join a body that grants Israel veto power over reconstruction and aid flows. The result is a hollowed-out sovereignty where Palestinian self-rule exists only on paper, and the ISF becomes the de facto enforcer of a new apartheid by consent. For the region, the stakes could not be higher: a failed stabilisation force would embolden Iran-backed militias from Lebanon to Yemen, while a successful one could entrench a US-aligned security belt from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, leaving Russia and China scrambling for influence.
The Long Shadow of Past 'Stabilisation' Missions in the Levant
History offers few reassuring precedents for externally imposed security frameworks in Gaza. The last time a similar model was attempted was during the 2005 Israeli withdrawal, when the European Union's Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was meant to monitor the Rafah crossing. Within months, Hamas had seized control of Gaza, and the mission collapsed. The 2006 Lebanon War exposed the flaws of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was tasked with disarming Hezbollah but ended up monitoring a stalemate that persists to this day. Even the 1978 Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, often cited as a success, required Israel and Egypt to agree on terms, a luxury absent in Gaza, where Hamas remains a non-state actor with veto power over any political transition. The Trump plan's insistence on Hamas's disarmament before an Israeli withdrawal ignores the group's 2007 coup, when it violently ejected Fatah from Gaza after Israel's unilateral disengagement. The lesson is clear: stabilisation without buy-in from the governed is not stabilisation at all. It is occupation by another name. And in Gaza, the governed have already rejected every externally imposed solution since 2005.
What Happened: The Legal Fine Print That Could Doom the ISF
According to reporting by Al Jazeera, Israel's security cabinet approved the ISF's entry on Sunday, but the decision came with strings attached that could strangle the force before it deploys. Israel retains veto power over which countries can contribute troops, a provision that excludes traditional Western peacekeepers like Canada or Norway, countries that might impose human rights conditions. The force's mandate is restricted to the 30 percent of Gaza not under Israeli control, effectively confining it to a shrinking patch of territory as Israel continues to redraw the 'Yellow Line' demarcating its occupation zones. The Trump plan also establishes a 'Board of Peace' to oversee reconstruction, but the board's director-general, Nickolay Mladenov, admitted that 'the vast majority of Western countries refused to join,' leaving the body dominated by US allies like Morocco and Uganda. Mladenov, a former Bulgarian foreign minister, called Israel's approval 'a critical part of the agreed framework,' yet his optimism rings hollow given the board's lack of legitimacy. The plan's call for a National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) to govern the strip technocratically is another non-starter: Hamas has already rejected the committee as a 'puppet body,' and Israel's refusal to allow Palestinian elections ensures no alternative leadership can emerge. The ISF's deployment timeline remains unspecified, and Israel's two-year war has left Gaza's infrastructure in ruins, making any stabilisation effort logistically nightmarish. As one analyst put it to Al Jazeera, 'You can't stabilise a graveyard.'
Global and Regional Reaction: A Divided World Lines Up Behind, or Against, the ISF
The ISF's approval has exposed deep fractures in the international response to Gaza's crisis. The United States, under President Trump, is the plan's chief architect, framing the ISF as a 'critical step toward demilitarisation and reconstruction.' European Union officials, however, have distanced themselves, with a spokesperson for the European External Action Service stating that the bloc 'does not see a role for itself in the current framework.' Arab states are similarly split: Morocco and Egypt have signalled willingness to contribute troops, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE have remained conspicuously silent, wary of legitimising an Israeli occupation that contravenes the Arab Peace Initiative. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the plan as 'a cover for continued ethnic cleansing,' while Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called it 'a new form of colonialism.' Russia, which has positioned itself as a counterweight to US influence in the Middle East, has not formally responded but is likely to view the ISF as a provocation, given Moscow's long-standing ties to Hamas. China, meanwhile, has adopted a cautious stance, expressing 'support for any initiative that reduces civilian suffering' but stopping short of endorsing the plan's political terms. The United Nations, which has been sidelined in the process, has warned that the ISF risks 'replicating the failures of past missions' without a clear exit strategy. The most glaring absence is that of the Palestinian Authority, which has dismissed the plan as 'a death sentence for Palestinian self-determination.' With no consensus on the ground, the ISF risks becoming a fig leaf for continued Israeli control rather than a path to peace.
South Asia Impact: The Corridor That Could Link Gaza to Kashmir
The ISF's approval arrives at a moment when South Asia's security calculus is already in flux. The 2024 withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan left a vacuum that Pakistan and India have scrambled to fill, with Islamabad brokering a fragile détente with the Taliban and New Delhi deepening ties with Central Asian states to counter Chinese influence. Yet Gaza's stabilisation, or lack thereof, could upend these calculations. If the ISF succeeds in pacifying Gaza, it could create a new axis of US-aligned security partners stretching from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, a development that would isolate Iran and push Pakistan further into the Chinese orbit. But if the force fails, the resulting chaos could spill into South Asia through two critical channels: the maritime routes of the Arabian Sea and the overland corridors of Afghanistan. The last time Gaza became a regional flashpoint was during the 2014 war, when Pakistani militants launched attacks in India citing solidarity with Hamas. A repeat scenario could force Islamabad to choose between cracking down on domestic militants or risking a new wave of cross-border violence. For New Delhi, the ISF's presence could embolden Israel to escalate its campaign against Iran-backed proxies in Syria and Lebanon, drawing India into a proxy war it has long avoided. The real question for Islamabad is whether it can leverage the ISF's deployment to extract concessions from Washington on Afghanistan or Kashmir, or whether it will be left scrambling to contain the fallout.
The Most Likely Outcomes, and the Red Lines That Could Derail Them
Analysts expect three scenarios to unfold over the next 12 months, each hinging on whether the ISF can navigate Gaza's labyrinth of political and security challenges. The first scenario, the 'Managed Chaos' outcome, assumes the ISF deploys but is confined to a shrinking patch of Gaza, unable to prevent daily clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian factions. In this case, the force becomes a fig leaf for continued Israeli occupation, and the humanitarian crisis deepens. The second scenario, the 'Proxy War Escalation,' sees the ISF's presence radicalise Hamas and its allies, leading to a new round of violence that draws in Iran and Hezbollah. This would force the US to either double down on its support for Israel or risk losing influence to Russia and China. The third scenario, the 'Fragile Stabilisation,' occurs if the ISF manages to broker a tenuous calm while Israel gradually withdraws from parts of Gaza. Even here, the risks are high: the NCAG technocratic body would lack legitimacy, and Hamas would remain a spoiler, ensuring that any 'peace' is temporary at best. A key question is whether the ISF's African and Arab contributors will prioritise stability over human rights, a gamble that could backfire if local populations view the force as complicit in Israeli crimes. Another uncertainty is the role of Egypt, which controls the Rafah crossing and could either facilitate or block the ISF's logistics. The most likely outcome, according to regional diplomats, is a blend of the first two scenarios: a prolonged standoff where violence ebbs and flows, but never quite ends. The wild card is Netanyahu's trip to Washington. If he secures additional US guarantees, military aid, political cover, or even a green light for further annexations, Israel may feel emboldened to tighten its grip on Gaza. If not, the ISF could become a bargaining chip in a larger negotiation over Palestinian statehood, a prospect that would horrify Netanyahu's far-right coalition. Either way, the ISF's deployment is not the beginning of the end for Gaza's crisis. It is merely the end of the beginning.
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Key Takeaways
- The ISF's approval is not a peace deal but a US-backed effort to outsource Gaza's security to 'friendly' African and Arab states, preserving Israel's occupation while outsourcing the dirty work of pacification.
- For South Asia, the ISF risks reviving militant transit routes between Gaza and Kashmir, forcing Pakistan and India to choose between containing fallout or leveraging the crisis for regional gains.
- History suggests stabilisation missions in Gaza fail when they lack buy-in from the governed; the ISF's exclusion of Western peacekeepers and Palestinian factions all but guarantees a repeat of past mistakes.
