The Briefing
On October 1, 2024, nearly 50 leaders from Europe and partner nations convened in Yerevan, Armenia, for the eighth European Political Community (EPC) Summit. The gathering—attended by all 27 EU member states alongside representatives from the UK, Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia—was framed as a forum on economic resilience, energy security, and geopolitical stability. However, the summit’s agenda was immediately overshadowed by two pressing conflicts: Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and the escalation of violence in the Middle East, particularly the Israel-Hamas confrontation. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan hosted the event, emphasizing regional solidarity amid frozen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and unresolved border disputes with Azerbaijan. While no formal resolutions were adopted, the summit served as a symbolic platform for European leaders to reaffirm unity against external threats, particularly Russian aggression and Iranian-backed proxy conflicts in the Levant.
The inclusion of non-EU states—such as Georgia, Moldova, and Serbia—highlighted the EPC’s evolving role as a bridge between Brussels and its eastern and southern neighbors. Turkey’s participation, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was closely watched amid Ankara’s balancing act between NATO commitments and its strategic relationship with Moscow. Meanwhile, the absence of Russia and Belarus underscored the deepening isolation of the Kremlin’s leadership and the EU’s determination to isolate it diplomatically. Energy security discussions centered on reducing European dependence on Russian gas and accelerating renewable transitions, a critical concern as winter approaches and global LNG markets remain volatile.
Why It Matters: The Bigger Picture
This summit represents more than a diplomatic gathering—it signals a strategic pivot in Europe’s approach to external threats and internal cohesion. The EPC, launched in 2022 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has evolved from a symbolic forum into a de facto crisis management mechanism. Its expansion to include non-EU states reflects a broader European strategy to create a ‘ring of stability’ around its borders, particularly in the South Caucasus and Balkans, where Russian influence remains strong. The inclusion of Armenia—a country that has recently distanced itself from Moscow—suggests a shift in the EU’s engagement in a region long dominated by Russian military and economic leverage.
Geopolitically, the summit underscores the EU’s growing recognition of energy security as a cornerstone of national sovereignty. The bloc’s push to diversify gas supplies—through LNG imports from the U.S., Qatar, and potential East Mediterranean routes—mirrors the 1970s oil crisis response but with a modern twist: the integration of green energy transitions into foreign policy. This aligns with the EU’s Green Deal and the REPowerEU plan, which aim to reduce hydrocarbon dependence by 40% by 2030. However, the summit also revealed fissures: countries like Hungary and Slovakia continue to resist full compliance with EU sanctions against Russia, highlighting the bloc’s internal disunity on energy policy. Meanwhile, the Middle East’s instability—amplified by Iran’s regional aggression and Israel’s military operations—threatens to draw European resources away from Ukraine, risking a ‘two-front crisis’ for NATO allies.
Historical Context
The Yerevan summit echoes the 1991 Copenhagen European Council, when the EU laid the groundwork for post-Cold War enlargement. However, unlike the optimistic expansionism of the 1990s, today’s EPC reflects a defensive geopolitics: containment of Russian expansionism, deterrence of Iranian proxies, and resilience against economic coercion. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe’s post-Cold War illusion of perpetual peace, forcing a rethink of collective security. This shift is reminiscent of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, where Cold War blocs used diplomacy to manage tensions—yet today’s summit lacks the ideological clarity of that era. Instead, Europe operates in a multipolar limbo, where alliances are fluid, and traditional power blocs (NATO, EU, CSTO) are increasingly porous. The rise of ‘minilateral’ forums—like the EPC or AUKUS—signals a fragmentation of global governance, where states prioritize issue-specific coalitions over rigid blocs.
South Asia Impact
For South Asia, the Yerevan summit carries indirect but significant implications, primarily through the lens of energy, trade, and strategic alignment. India, the region’s largest energy importer, has already begun diversifying its LNG imports to mitigate risks from volatile markets. The EU’s push for alternative gas suppliers—including Azerbaijan via the Southern Gas Corridor and potential future routes from Turkmenistan or Iraq—could divert regional gas flows away from South Asia, potentially increasing competition for limited LNG cargoes. India’s recent long-term deals with Qatar and the U.S. suggest it is navigating this transition proactively, but smaller economies like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka remain vulnerable to price shocks, especially as global oil prices remain sensitive to Middle Eastern conflicts.
Diplomatically, the summit’s emphasis on countering Russian and Iranian influence may pressure South Asian states to recalibrate their non-aligned positions. Pakistan, already grappling with economic instability and a reliance on Russian fuel imports, faces a dilemma: deepen ties with Moscow to secure discounted oil or align with Western sanctions to access IMF bailouts and trade benefits. The EU’s growing engagement in the South Caucasus—including Armenia’s pivot away from Russia—could further isolate Pakistan diplomatically if it continues to hedge between Washington and Moscow. Meanwhile, India’s strategic autonomy is being tested by its need to balance energy security with its partnership with Russia (a major arms supplier) and its growing ties with the West. The summit’s focus on energy security may accelerate India’s shift toward renewables, but the transition will be slow, leaving the country exposed to geopolitical shocks in the interim.
Security dynamics also intersect with South Asia’s interests. The EU’s hardening stance against Iranian-backed proxies in the Middle East could embolden India to take a more assertive role in countering Iranian influence in Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea. Conversely, Pakistan’s deepening ties with Iran—through the China-Pakistan-Iran economic corridor—could create friction with Western-aligned states in Europe. The summit’s discussions on Middle Eastern stability may indirectly influence South Asia’s security calculus, particularly in Afghanistan, where Taliban rule and terrorist sanctuaries remain a concern for both India and the EU.
What Happens Next
Projection 1: The EU’s energy diversification push will accelerate, but internal divisions will persist. Hungary and Slovakia are likely to continue resisting full compliance with Russian sanctions, creating a ‘sanctions-lite’ bloc within the EU. This will force the bloc to explore creative financial mechanisms—such as price caps or secondary sanctions—to maintain leverage over Moscow. For South Asia, this could mean prolonged volatility in global energy prices, particularly if Russian oil continues to flow through informal channels to India and Pakistan.
Projection 2: Armenia’s engagement with the EU will deepen, potentially leading to a formal association agreement within two years. This would further isolate Azerbaijan and strain its relationship with Turkey, creating a new flashpoint in the South Caucasus. For South Asia, this could disrupt existing trade routes via Azerbaijan and Georgia, forcing India and Pakistan to seek alternative corridors—such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) via Iran—to maintain connectivity with Europe.
Projection 3: The Middle East’s instability will spill into South Asia, particularly through the rise of proxy conflicts involving Iran and Saudi Arabia. If the EU adopts a more assertive stance against Iranian-backed groups, India may face pressure to align more closely with Western positions, potentially straining its ties with Iran and Russia. Pakistan, meanwhile, could find itself caught in the middle, balancing its economic reliance on Iranian gas with its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Regional security could deteriorate, particularly in Afghanistan, where terrorist groups may exploit the distraction caused by European preoccupation with Ukraine and the Middle East.
The Yerevan summit, while not a turning point in itself, encapsulates the broader challenges facing Europe and South Asia: how to navigate a fragmented world order where traditional alliances are no longer sufficient. The answers will not come from summits alone, but from the daily choices of states navigating energy wars, proxy conflicts, and shifting power dynamics.
